Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses

Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatus (Research Notes)#

Reproduction of Production Conditions#

In the past, when discussing production activities as a necessary condition for the renewal of means of production, there was something in my analysis that was only briefly mentioned or merely an accompanying implicit line. Now I want to reveal it more fully and study it in its own right. As Marx said, a social form cannot sustain itself for a year without reproducing the conditions of production. Even children know this. Therefore, the ultimate condition of production is the reproduction of various production conditions. It can be "simple" (to be precise, the reproduction of the prerequisites of production) or it can be a form of "expanded scale" (expansion on simple reproduction). Let us temporarily ignore this distinction. So, what is the reproduction of production conditions? Here we will enter a field that has been very familiar to people since the publication of Volume II of "Capital," yet has been precisely overlooked. Isolating the perspective of production or even the simple practice of production (which is abstractly related to the production process) has a fixed obviousness (a type of empirical ideological obviousness). These two perspectives are so seamlessly integrated into our daily "consciousness" that to prompt everyone to accept the perspective of reproduction, while not entirely impossible, is extremely difficult. However, without this perspective, everything is merely fantasy (distortion is worse than one-sidedness), even at the level of production, let alone at the level of pure practice. Let us try to study this issue step by step. In short, once we acknowledge that every social form originates from a dominant mode of production, we can assert that the production process must operate within certain production relations and is constrained by them. The conclusion that follows is: for survival, and to be able to produce, every social form must simultaneously reproduce the conditions of production. Therefore, it must carry out: 1. the reproduction of productive forces, 2. the reproduction of existing production relations. The reproduction of means of production was convincingly demonstrated by Marx in Volume II of "Capital," where he argued that without the reproduction of material means of production, i.e., the reproduction of means of production, production activities would be impossible. Now, everyone (including bourgeois economists funded by the state or those modern "macroeconomic" theorists) recognizes this. Even economists of average competence know that each year it is necessary to clarify in advance what is needed to replace losses in production, such as raw materials, fixed facilities (factories), production tools (machines), etc. This is the most basic common sense. Economists of average competence also understand this. I say average-level economists = average-level capitalists because they both adopt the perspective of enterprise management, merely contenting themselves with commenting on the actual financial accounting of enterprise management. Fortunately, Quesnay was the first to raise this "obvious" question, and fortunately, Marx answered it. These two geniuses made us understand that we cannot think about the reproduction of material means of production at the level of enterprise management, because at that level, such reproduction does not exist within its actual conditions. What occurs at the level of enterprise management is merely a material effect; it only provides a notion of the necessity of reproduction, and absolutely does not provide the conditions and mechanisms for reproduction that can be scrutinized. A reflection on this is sufficient to prove this point. A capitalist, Mr. X, who produces wool yarn in his factory, must carry out the "reproduction" of raw materials and machinery. But his own factory does not produce these things. They are produced by Mr. Y, an Australian rancher, and Mr. Z, an engineer engaged in machinery manufacturing. With their products, Mr. X can carry out the reproduction of production conditions. And Mr. Y and Mr. Z must also reproduce their own production conditions to produce these products. Similarly, their reproduction conditions also depend on the products of other capitalists. This can go on endlessly. Whether in the domestic market or the international market, this is how it operates; the satisfaction of the demand for means of production (serving reproduction) depends on market supply. This mechanism leads to an "endless chain." To scrutinize it, one must follow the "global" process elucidated by Marx, especially studying the relationship between the capital cycles in Volume II and III of "Capital" regarding the first category (the production of means of production) and the second category (the production of consumer goods), as well as the issue of the realization of surplus value. We will not conduct a deeper analysis of this. The objective existence of the problem that production must involve the reproduction of material conditions is clear and does not require elaboration.

Reproduction of Labor Power#

However, there is a question that readers will not overlook. We have discussed the reproduction of means of production, but we have not yet discussed the reproduction of productive forces. The concept of labor power distinguishes productive forces from means of production, and the reproduction of labor power is precisely the issue we have just overlooked. From our observations of enterprise management, especially from the examination of actual financial accounting of anticipated installment payments and investments, we can obtain the objective existence of the material process of reproduction.

In specific terms, it is only within the realm of the economic base's determining role that it corresponds to the real situation. The action of the state on the various levels of the superstructure determined by the ultimate decisive role of the economic base marks, as Marx stated in "The Communist Manifesto" and "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," and in all the later classical texts of Marx and Lenin, that the superstructure has its "relative independence" concerning the economic base; and the superstructure above the economic base has a kind of "interaction." Lenin's "State and Revolution" clearly states that the state is a repressive apparatus. Therefore, we can say that the topography of Marxism, i.e., the theoretical metaphor of the building (the base and superstructure), is very strict in this regard. The state is a coercive machine that ensures the ruling class (in the 19th century, the bourgeoisie) maintains its dominance over the working class through "repressive tools," which can exploit this tool's function to adhere to the process of surplus value extraction (i.e., the issue of dependency, which forces us to consider the mutual interaction of the superstructure in the Marxist tradition alongside the economic base).

Thus, the state is primarily what classical Marxist writers refer to as the state machine. This term not only refers to specialized machines (related to legal practices, such as police, courts, prisons, etc.), which have been recognized as necessary, but also refers to the military, which directly intervenes in situations as a coercive force (the proletariat has paid the price for this experience), taking "emergency actions" and its special forces, as well as the heads of state, government, and administrative institutions above all this. Just as this form presents, Marx and Lenin's exploration of the state "theory" touches upon substantial points. The substantial point is that there is no doubt that the elements that make things exist and the facts presented are defined by the nature of the superstructure based on the reproduction foundation, and it is possible and necessary to reflect on this. Although the metaphor of the building indicates the existence of many issues, it cannot provide conceptual answers to these issues. Once people adopt the perspective of reproduction, these issues will immediately become clear. As I have pointed out, regarding the building metaphor (the base and superstructure), the above qualitative explanations about the state are still only partial descriptions. I will conduct a brief analysis of law, the state, and ideology from this perspective. While adopting the perspective of reproduction, I will also reveal the truth from the perspectives of practice and production.

In other words, schools (as well as other state institutions such as churches or other state machines like the military) teach "specialized knowledge," which formally guarantees submission to the ruling ideology or ensures the control of the ruling ideology in practice. All those who implement production, agents of exploitation and oppression, not to mention those "ideological specialists" (in Marx's words), must be "drenched" in some way by the ruling ideology to "fulfill their duties." This applies to the exploited (the proletariat) and the exploiters (the bourgeoisie), the dependents of the exploiters (managers), and the high priests of the ruling ideology (staff), and so on. Here it is revealed that the necessary conditions for the reproduction of labor power are not only the reproduction of labor skills but also the reproduction of submission to the ruling ideology. Even this "not only... but also..." is not sufficient, because it is evident that the preparation for the reproduction of labor skills is in the form of submission to ideology and is constrained by it. This acknowledges the effective existence of a new entity: ideology. Here I want to make two points. First, I must complete the analysis of reproduction. I have just briefly outlined the forms of the reproduction of productive forces (i.e., the reproduction of means of production) and the forms of the reproduction of labor power. However, I have not yet addressed the issue of the reproduction of production relations. This is a crucial issue for Marxist theory regarding modes of production. Ignoring this issue would be a theoretical error—one might say a serious political mistake. Therefore, I will discuss this issue here. But to comply with the logical method of discussion, I will take a detour.

Secondly, to take this detour, I must reintroduce the question I raised earlier: What is society? I have emphasized several times the revolutionary nature of the Marxist concept of "social totality" to distinguish it from Hegel's concept of "totality." I have said (and the following arguments are merely a repetition of the famous propositions of historical materialism) that Marx envisions each society as a structure composed of "levels" or "instances." It has a specific segmentation, dividing into a lower structure or economic base (the "unity" of productive forces and production relations) and a superstructure. The superstructure includes two "levels" or "instances": one is political—legal (law and state), and the other is ideological (different ideologies, religious, ethical, legal, political, etc.). This image not only has enlightening benefits theoretically (it reveals the distinction between Marx and Hegel) but also has its important theoretical strengths: it makes it possible to remember what I call the signs of their respective functions within the theoretical mechanism of its basic concepts. What does this mean? Viewing the image of each social structure as a building with two "floors" on a foundation (the lower structure), it is clearly a metaphor: more precisely, it is a spatial metaphor: a topographical metaphor. Like every metaphor, it suggests something and makes something visible. What does it suggest and reveal? Precisely, the upper floor cannot "stand" (in the air) alone if it does not sit precisely on the foundation. The purpose of the building metaphor is to emphasize the "ultimate determining role" of the economic base, and the effect it produces endows the economic base with a sign of function. This sign has become widely known due to a famous saying: what happens in the upper "floor" (i.e., the superstructure) is ultimately determined by what happens in the economic base. By this "ultimate" sign of function, each "level" of the superstructure is explicitly assigned different signs of function. What are these signs divided into? Since each level of the superstructure depends on the function of the economic base, it can be said that the levels of the superstructure do not have an ultimate determining role. If their determining role has its specific way, it is only within the realm of the economic base's determining role that it corresponds to the real situation. I will frequently use the adjective "descriptive" from now on. To avoid ambiguous meanings, it becomes necessary to explain the terminology. When referring to the building metaphor or the Marxist "theory of the state," whenever I say these are descriptive concepts or objects, I have no intention of criticism. On the contrary, I have reason to believe that great scientific discoveries must go through what I call the "descriptive theory" stage. It is the first stage of all theories, at least in the relevant categories (the category of social science). However, the descriptive theory of the state represents only one stage in the entire formation of state theory, and this theory itself must seek the "replacement" of this stage. The definition of the state just mentioned links the facts of coercion with the state, treating the state as a coercive state machine. If this connection indeed provides us with a method to prove and understand these facts, then it is very clear that this "mutual relationship" leads to a very specific obviousness. I will discuss this later, and I want to say that the exact meaning of the above explanation is: "Yes, that's right, it is indeed true!"

(1) The "descriptive theory" is undoubtedly the irreversible beginning stage of theory, but (2) the theory presented in descriptive form precisely requires the development of theory itself, so the theory is fundamentally in development. Let us turn to the current topic—the state—thus further clarifying the above concepts. When I refer to the Marxist theory of the state, it is merely a partial descriptive theory; first, it refers to this classic definition; secondly, it indicates that this beginning defines substantial points, that is, it specifies the substantial points of Marxist state theory, which are the principles of every later development.

Let me first clarify a point: the state (and its existence in the state machine) has no meaning if it does not function as state power. All political class struggles revolve around the state. What I mean is that sometimes a certain class possesses (i.e., seizes and controls) state power, and sometimes it is a coalition of classes or a partial alliance among classes that jointly possesses state power. This explanation compels me to distinguish between the political class struggle's purpose and the state machine. In Marx's "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" and "Class Struggles in France," as well as in later works, there are clear statements. This distinction is crucial for developing state theory, as it emphasizes the need to differentiate between state power and state machines. The state machine includes government, administrative institutions, military, police, courts, prisons, etc. I will collectively refer to them as coercive state machines. "Coercive" implies that the above state machines function through violence, at least in the ultimate sense; (4) the proletariat must seize state power to smash the existing bourgeois state machine and replace it with a completely different proletarian state machine.

I believe that the path I am currently taking has only been traversed by Gramsci before. He had a "remarkable" idea that the state cannot be reduced to a coercive state machine. He proposed that the state also includes a certain number of "civil society" institutions, such as churches, schools, trade unions, etc. In the context of the above statements, I originally intended to supplement the Marxist theory of the state, but it has already become apparent that this theory is still a partial description, although it indeed contains many complex and mutually different principles. However, understanding the functions and roles of these principles requires further development of the theory.

I refer to a certain number of entities as ideological state machines. They manifest directly in front of observers in the form of various specialized institutions. I propose a list of these entities based on experience, which clearly requires detailed examination, verification, correction, and reorganization. Declaring this need itself encompasses all reservations. Therefore, we can now consider the following institutions as ideological state machines (the order of their arrangement has no special significance):

Religious ideological state machines (various church systems),
Educational ideological state machines (various public and private school systems),
Family ideological state machines,
Legal ideological state machines,
Political ideological state machines (political systems, including various parties),
Trade union ideological state machines,
Media ideological state machines (publishing, broadcasting, television, etc.),
Cultural ideological state machines (literature, art, sports competitions, etc.).

Ideological state machines cannot be confused with coercive state machines. So, what constitutes the distinction between them?

First, it is clear that there is only one (coercive) state machine, but there are many ideological state machines. One can even only speculate about the existence of this "many," because the unit factors constituting the plurality of ideological state machines as entities are not a unified (coercive) state machine.

Second, the unified (coercive) state machine entirely belongs to the public domain; in contrast, ideological state machines are an obvious decentralized system, with a large part belonging to the private domain. Churches, parties, trade unions, families, certain schools, most newspapers, various cultural speculative enterprises, etc.

People may overlook the first point, but there will certainly be questions raised about the second point. They may ask why I believe that most institutions of ideological state machines do not have public status but are merely private. As a conscious Marxist, Gramsci has already refuted this objection. The distinction between public and private is a distinction within bourgeois law, which has a solid basis in the (subordinate) realm, because bourgeois law exercises "authority" precisely in this realm. However, there is no such distinction in the state realm, as the state is "above the law"; the state is the state of the ruling class, which is neither public nor private, and quite the opposite, it is the state that determines the distinction between public and private. Starting from the study of ideological state machines, one would arrive at the same conclusion. The institutions we perceive as "public" or "private" are not important; what matters is how they function. As private institutions of ideological state machines, they can fully perform their functions. A rigorous rational analysis of any ideological state machine can now lead us to the substantive issues.

The fundamental difference between ideological state machines and coercive state machines is that coercive state machines function through "violent means," while ideological state machines function "ideologically." I will revise the phrasing regarding this difference to clarify the issue. Every state machine, whether coercive or ideological, functions through both violent means and ideological ways. However, there is a very important distinction that can completely avoid confusion between ideological state machines and coercive state machines.

Coercive state machines primarily and mainly use coercive means (including personal coercion) to function; secondly, they use ideological means. This is a fact. (There is absolutely no purely coercive machine.) For example, the military and police also use ideological methods to exercise their functions, as they ensure internal unity and guarantee the "self-image" they promote externally.

The forms are the same but need to be reversed: ideological state machines primarily and mainly use ideological means to function; secondly, they use coercive means, although in the ultimate sense, it is only diluted, concealed, or even symbolic. (There is absolutely no purely ideological machine.) Schools and churches use methods such as punishment, expulsion, and dismissal to discipline both teachers and pastors, as well as students and congregants. The truth of families and cultural ideological state machines is also the same (especially censorship), and I will not enumerate them all here.

The coercive means and ideological ways determine the dual (primary and secondary) functions of state machines. This dual function belongs to both coercive state machines and ideological state machines, illustrating the very obvious yet subtly defined (or tacit) combination of the distinctions formed by the mutual influence of the two types of state machines. Is it necessary to supplement this further? Daily life provides us with countless examples, but if we are not satisfied with mere observation and want to go further, we must study these examples closely.

The above discussion still guides us to understand what constitutes the unit elements of the seemingly distinct individual ideological state machines. If ideological state machines primarily and mainly function through ideological means, then it is this function that unifies their diversity. As for the ideology they use to function, it is always unified under the ruling ideology, although there are differences and contradictions between it and the ruling ideology. This ruling ideology is the ideology of the ruling class. Given that the "ruling class" essentially holds state power (openly, but more often in the form of alliances between classes or partial alliances among classes), and possesses the (coercive) state machine at its disposal, we will acknowledge that the aforementioned ruling class has the initiative in ideological state machines, so that in the ultimate sense, the ruling ideology is realized within the ideological state machines, precisely, it is realized within its opposite. Acting through the (coercive) state machine using laws and decrees is fundamentally different from acting through the ideological state machine with the ruling ideology as an intermediary. We must delve into the details of the differences between the two; however, this difference does not obscure the deep-seated unity of the two. To my knowledge, any class that does not place the ideological state machine under its control and exercise its hegemony within it while holding state power will not maintain its rule for long. I will cite one example to prove this point: Lenin's particular concern for the revolutionization of the educational ideological state machine was precisely to ensure that it could serve the Soviet proletariat that had seized power, to guarantee the future consolidation of the proletarian dictatorship and the transition to socialism.

From the above explanation, it can be understood that ideological state machines can not only be markers of territorial boundaries but also arenas of class struggle—often intense class struggles. The ruling class (or class alliance) cannot easily legislate in ideological state machines as it can in (coercive) state machines, not only because the ruling class can maintain its strong position in ideological state machines for a long time, but also because the exploited class can find various ways to resist within ideological state machines, either by exploiting contradictions within the ruling class or by defeating their arguments in debates.

Now let me summarize.

If the propositions I have put forward can be established, I will use them to trace back to the classical Marxist theory of the state and make one of its points more precise. I believe it is necessary to distinguish between state power and the state machine under the leadership of state agents executing the ruling class's interests. Moreover, I also believe that the state machine includes two types of institutional units: those representing coercive state machines and those representing the different individual units of ideological state machines. If the above is accepted, the following questions arise: What is the scope of the ideological state machines' functions? On what basis are they considered important? In other words, if these ideological state machines function not through coercion but through ideology, what do their functions correspond to?

On the Reproduction of Production Relations#

The central question that has remained unresolved in the lengthy discussion above is: How is the reproduction of production relations ensured? Now I can answer this. If I were to speak in the language of topography (lower and upper structures), I would say: the reproduction of production relations is largely ensured by the legal-political and ideological superstructure. However, I believe the essence of the problem lies in transcending this descriptive language. Therefore, I would rather say: the reproduction of production relations is largely ensured by the (ruling class) exercising certain functions within the state machine (both coercive and ideological state machines).

It is essential to note the content I just discussed; it now converges into the following three characteristic forms:

All state machines function through both coercion and ideology. The distinction lies in that coercive state machines primarily and mainly use coercive means, while ideological state machines primarily and mainly utilize ideological means.
Coercive state machines form an organized whole, adhering to a directive body, while ideological state machines are a pluralistic composite; they are relatively independent of each other and can provide a natural battleground for class struggle and the struggles of the proletariat against the capitalist class.
The consistency of coercive state machines is guaranteed by the unification of the ruling class's political policies; the consistency of the various ideological state machines usually relies on the ruling ideology, i.e., the ideology of the ruling class, in the context of opposing situations.

Now let me summarize.

The conflicts of the two struggles display their effects in limited or extreme ways, and this is also true in other subordinate forms of class struggle.

The task of coercive state machines, in essence, is to use force (personal harm or other means) to ensure the political conditions for the reproduction of production relations (which ultimately are exploitative relations). The state machine not only works tirelessly for its own reproduction (the capitalist state includes political ruling groups, military ruling groups, etc.) but more importantly, it also uses coercive means (from the most brutal personal violence, pure administrative orders and prohibitions, to open and concealed censorship) to ensure the political conditions for the operation of ideological state machines.

In fact, in a special sense, it is precisely the ideological state machines that heavily concentrate the ruling ideology (i.e., the ruling class's ideology) on the ideological state machines. It is essential to pay attention to the content I just discussed; it now converges into the following three characteristic forms:

All state machines function through both coercion and ideology. The distinction lies in that coercive state machines primarily and mainly use coercive means, while ideological state machines primarily and mainly utilize ideological means.
Coercive state machines form an organized whole, adhering to a directive body, while ideological state machines are a pluralistic composite; they are relatively independent of each other and can provide a natural battleground for class struggle and the struggles of the proletariat against the capitalist class.
The consistency of coercive state machines is guaranteed by the unification of the ruling class's political policies; the consistency of the various ideological state machines usually relies on the ruling ideology, i.e., the ideology of the ruling class, in the context of opposing situations.

Now let me summarize.

The conflicts of the two struggles display their effects in limited or extreme ways, and this is also true in other subordinate forms of class struggle.