Grassroots Notifications and Secret Visits

According to the survey, dark visits have the following seven characteristics:#

First, there are no inspection notices issued.
The higher-ups do not inform the county or township about whether they will check or when they will check, making it impossible for the county and township to prepare like they would for a scheduled inspection. Often, the county and township only learn about the dark visit after it has been reported.
Second, the inspection team has few members.
Unlike the large inspection teams with dozens of members, dark visit teams consist of three to five people, sometimes as few as two, primarily young individuals. They dress fashionably, avoiding the appearance of officials, and carry bags and cameras into villages, resembling tourists or relatives visiting, making it difficult for villagers and rural officials to notice them.
Third, the inspection team may be a third-party organization.
Some dark visit teams are hired third-party organizations, making it difficult for the county and township to establish contact with them. Even if they know about the dark visit, it is hard to navigate relationships with these teams.
Fourth, they come with problems.
Dark visit teams differ from inspection teams. Inspection teams aim to understand facts and supervise work; they do not necessarily need to find problems or take problems away, as many issues can be "rectified" on the spot. Dark visit teams sometimes come with problem clues, so they must understand the problem situation and bring detailed, evidence-supported issues. Even if they do not bring problems, they must leave with problems because the purpose of a dark visit is to discover issues. If no problems are reported, the work cannot be reflected. Once a dark visit occurs, regardless of whether grassroots work is good or bad, there will certainly be a problem report.
Fifth, they do not interact with county and township officials.
Dark visit teams do not engage with frontline staff; the problems identified by inspectors are viewed from their perspective, not from the specific temporal and spatial context. Inspection teams need to interact with the county and township, allowing them to explain issues in a specific context and present the objectivity of the problems. For example, if a dark visit team enters an old courtyard by climbing over a wall and finds a dry toilet that has not been converted to a water toilet, they report it as a problem. However, in reality, the family has not returned home for five or six years after moving to the city, and the county and township cannot change the toilet without permission, even if they wanted to. But the dark visit team does not understand these objective factors, turning one aspect of the problem into the only issue. Because they cannot explain it, the policy does not receive practical feedback.
Sixth, there is excessive management of problems.
Because they need to take problems away, dark visit teams focus on discovering issues, often defining problems with a broad perspective or self-defined criteria, which is excessive management. For instance, during a dark visit by the discipline inspection commission, they might consider grassroots staff eating breakfast in their offices, having vases on their desks, or not having anything on their desks as problems. Similarly, if there is suddenly a piece of paper or a lump of chicken droppings on a clean rural street, which is an incidental phenomenon, it can be photographed and taken back as a significant problem.
Seventh, problems are reported across levels.
The results of dark visits at the provincial and municipal levels are generally communicated to the county and township in the form of reports, but the problems are not directly addressed. After receiving the report, relevant senior leaders at the county level must provide instructions to show their attention, while also forming investigation teams to investigate and address relevant issues and responsible individuals.

The impact of dark visits and inspections on policy implementation and grassroots governance includes:#

First, improving daily work.
Taking the improvement of the living environment as an example, to prevent unforeseen circumstances, village cadres stationed in townships must go to the countryside daily to supervise sanitation workers to fulfill their duties, urging village officials to pay attention and promoting sanitation details and habits to villagers.
Second, policy rigidity.
On one hand, dark visits eliminate the ambiguous space of policies; policies need to be completed to standard or beyond, and some policies that do not align with rural realities cannot be flexibly implemented. On the other hand, the lack of feedback from policy practice leads to an inability to make timely adjustments and corrections to policies.
Third, comprehensive rectification.
Unless dark visits are conducted with problem clues, most dark visits are point-based, generalizing issues. For example, if a problem arises in one township during a dark visit, it implies that similar issues exist throughout the county, necessitating rectification across the county, which can lead to a situation where "one person is sick, the whole family takes medicine."
Fourth, increasing pressure.
In inspections, the county and township are communities of interest, collaborating to prepare for inspections. However, in dark visits, if a township has issues, it also becomes the county's problem and responsibility, thus requiring both the county and township to work together to eliminate the problems. The county and township also have a basis for collaboration. However, since dark visits cannot eliminate problems through collaboration, the county must urge townships to do their work well before the higher-level dark visits occur, leading them to conduct dark visits as well. The requirements for higher-level dark visits are strict, and to avoid any issues, the county will be more stringent during dark visits, effectively increasing the pressure at each level. Unlike past inspections where the county would check first to promote work and train for inspections, if the county identifies problems during a dark visit, it will initiate punitive procedures. Since it is unknown when higher-ups will conduct dark visits, the county's dark visits must become routine.
Fifth, increasing penalties.
After the provincial and municipal reports of problems, the county, to show its seriousness about the issues, not only responds quickly, issues instructions promptly, and investigates quickly but also increases penalties for those below, intensifying accountability. By expressing its stance to higher-ups, the county also partially shifts its own responsibility.
Increasing pressure:
First, urging subordinates to produce achievements and highlights to secure a good ranking.
For example, in party-building materials, the province and city require the county level to submit ten work materials, while the county's organizational department assigns fifteen tasks to townships, which in turn add more than fifteen tasks at the village level, with all levels demanding innovation from their subordinates. Similarly, the province requires that 30% of the members of the township's leadership team be under 35 years old, while the city demands 60% from the county, leading the county to achieve over 80%.
Second, urging subordinates to do their work better,
to cope with dark visits and other supervisory forms, avoiding detection of problems and accountability.
How to "reflect work":
Townships interpret the behavior of higher-level departments assigning non-core work tasks as:
"Reflecting work" means showing that they are also doing their jobs. The work that higher-level departments want to "reflect" can be of two types. One type involves professional matters related only to their own departments. There is competition and comparison between departments, especially among those with similar or connected functions. If other departments are working, their own department must also work, and even do better than others. For instance, the work of the cultural bureau and the sports bureau is comparable, assessing who provides more cultural and sports services in their jurisdiction. Even if there is no direct comparison, sending performance signals to the same-level party committee government and higher-level counterpart departments requires content to discuss what they have accomplished.

The other type involves politically tasked affairs.#

This refers to the central work of the local party committee and government, where each professional department uses its resources to engage in central work or reflect central work within professional affairs. For example, at the beginning of 2020, pandemic prevention and control became the central work of governments at all levels, and departments could not remain idle; they also needed to contribute, integrating pandemic response into their work. For instance, women's federations in various regions would survey and comfort women returning from Wuhan, community property management would deploy staff to the frontline of pandemic response, and the catering industry would provide food for frontline personnel and those infected. All these efforts would be counted as part of their work in relevant departments to demonstrate their contributions to pandemic control.
To reflect work, one must take action. The more actions taken, the more work can be reflected. To this end, higher-level departments will undertake several complementary actions:

First, making the unreal real.
In the past, when there was no need to reflect work, general departmental work was either superficially done or done minimally. Once work is delegated to townships, the workload is not too heavy, allowing townships to prioritize their tasks. Now, every department must reflect work, so they must first turn existing superficial tasks into real ones. This is true for the work of the people's congress and the political consultative conference. Tasks are assigned from above, and subordinates must act. When subordinates act, the work of higher-ups is completed, thus reflecting the work of higher-ups.
Second, creating work.
Higher-ups not only need to make existing tasks substantive but also need to do more work to better reflect work. To reflect doing more work, higher-ups will continuously increase the number of departments or sections involved in work, such as the organizational department's organizational section expanding from one section to three, with one section's work becoming the work of three sections, incorporating previously neglected tasks and directly increasing workload. Various sections compete with each other and continuously create new forms and content of work, which also significantly increases workload. Ultimately, all this work must be implemented at the village level, inevitably increasing the workload of relevant departments and sections at the village level.
Third, standardizing work.
Higher-ups do not directly do the work; to reflect work, they must ensure that subordinates genuinely carry out their tasks, which requires monitoring the work. In the past, many tasks were considered complete once reported by townships, but this can no longer be done. Townships are not trustworthy; if they submit false reports and higher-ups discover issues, the work of higher-ups cannot be reflected, and they will face penalties. To ensure that townships act according to their intentions, higher-ups will issue corresponding standards when delegating tasks, requiring subordinates to follow these standards and checking and accepting work according to these standards. For subordinates, following standards and leaving traces at each step also serves as proof of their work, making it easier to report back to higher-ups.
For higher-ups, if subordinates follow standards, the results will not deviate from expectations, allowing them to reflect work. For example, in energy conservation and emission reduction work, higher-ups specify the specific content and materials that subordinates must report monthly. Subordinates follow the steps and guidelines, enabling higher-ups to reflect work while subordinates can cope with inspections and complete their tasks.
As a result, after reaching the township level, previously superficial tasks must become substantive, the number of tasks to be completed increases, and they must be done according to standards, leading to a multiplied workload.
Why "reflect work":
Essentially, it strengthens the supervisory power of the same-level party committee over various fields of work, creating a genuine work atmosphere.
Various fields and departments may also engage in both superficial and substantive work, creating more tasks and enhancing supervision over subordinate counterpart departments. For subordinate counterpart departments, they must not only "reflect work" to the same-level party committee government but also to higher-level counterpart departments.

Second, the importance of leadership impressions has increased.#

In grassroots county and township governance, political considerations must be taken into account for any task. When non-essential departments assign tasks to townships, townships may treat them casually, but department leaders will remind township party secretaries to consider the political implications, leaving the secretaries with no choice but to pay attention. Once an issue is elevated to a political level, there is little room for maneuvering below. Although a particular task may not be important for a township, it is part of the overall work of the county. If the work of a certain township affects the overall work of the county, the township party secretary will be seen as lacking in awareness of the bigger picture.
The comprehensive work assessment of townships by the county strives for high rankings. For other non-core, non-key tasks, townships mainly aim to avoid falling behind. Although these tasks do not enter the comprehensive assessment scope, the annual assessment rankings are visible to the main leaders at the county level. If a township consistently ranks too low or shows significant decline, it creates a negative impression on county leaders. Particularly, if the work overseen by a county committee member is poorly executed, township leaders will lose points in front of the committee member, affecting future work and promotions.
Because leaders primarily focus on comprehensive rankings.
Of course, if a township does not prioritize a particular task and consistently ranks low, leaders of higher-level counterpart departments may report to county leaders that the township is politically negligent and lacks a broader perspective.
The competitive mechanism at the level of middle management has stimulated the enthusiasm of middle-level cadres in the following four ways:
First, positions are actively competed for, rather than assigned by leaders, making even the most challenging tasks necessary to undertake. This compels middle-level cadres to adapt to their roles and achieve results, which is both a matter of face and a need for self-validation. It is akin to a marriage chosen against the wishes of elders; after marriage, one must manage family life well to prove that the choice was correct.
Second, competitive appointments lead to a high match between people and positions. Middle-level cadres engage in work they enjoy, are suited for, or find challenging, which inherently motivates them.
Third, self-selected tasks are more likely to be viewed as part of their responsibilities. Middle-level cadres develop an intrinsic sense of responsibility towards their work, treating it as their own rather than merely completing tasks assigned by leaders, leading to greater enthusiasm and initiative in their work.
Fourth, middle-level cadres are elected, indicating that they have received recognition from all leading cadres in the township, which is both an honor and a responsibility, thus motivating them to perform well.
The same reasoning applies to the selection of ordinary cadres; during the selection process, they have already been "picky," so they cannot be "picky" or complain during their work.
This selection mechanism, as a personnel arrangement mechanism, is an important reflection of the personnel authority of the party committee secretary.
Through innovative mechanisms, township party secretaries can mobilize the subjectivity, initiative, and enthusiasm of ordinary cadres even in the absence of personnel advisory rights, stimulating their intrinsic motivation to work.
Personnel advisory rights and decision-making rights are two different types of personnel authority. While township party secretaries strive for advisory rights, they should seek breakthroughs and innovations in personnel matters more through decision-making rights, aligning people with positions and personnel.

The results of individual assessments have three operational pathways:#

First, rewards and penalties.
Award-winning townships will receive individual awards and rewards, such as the poverty alleviation award, with a first prize of 300,000 yuan, which can be autonomously allocated by the township. Compared to project funds and financial resources for the township, this is "liquid money" that can be freely allocated, including bonuses (with higher-level approval). This encourages townships to invest heavily in creating highlights to obtain "liquid money." Some individual assessment tasks may also hold year-end summary meetings, where awards and penalties are reported, experiences are shared, and speeches are made.
Second, policy incentives,
such as an extra month's salary. Each individual award can lead to an additional month's salary. If a city wins a certain individual award from the province, all units in the city can receive an extra month's salary; if a county wins a certain individual award from the city, all units in the county can also receive an extra month's salary. Townships are no exception. By the end of the year, well-performing townships can receive an additional 5 to 8 months' salary. Some county-level units can even receive 11 or 12 months' salary. The higher-ups provide the policy, but the funds still come from the units. Some poorer units may not have the funds to distribute rewards even if they win. This is a reward for all staff members in the unit, with each person receiving their original salary.
Third, political evaluation.
Individual assessments serve as an important indicator for the county to evaluate the main leaders of townships, functioning as a "single-center" work comprehensive assessment. If a township wins an excellent award in comprehensive assessment (or good) and also receives multiple individual assessment awards, it indicates that the overall work of that township is at a high level; if a township does not win an award in comprehensive assessment but receives several first prizes in individual work, it shows that the township has unique characteristics and features; if some important townships lag behind in most individual awards, only receiving one or two, it indicates that the main leaders of these townships are not performing well, which will affect the political evaluation of county leaders towards them. Conversely, if county leaders do not hold the main leaders of townships in high regard, it may lead to fewer awards in individual assessments for those townships.
The content of knowledge learning for grassroots young cadres includes the following three aspects:

First, learning to improve theoretical literacy. Grassroots young cadres have a strong initiative to enhance their theoretical literacy. Improving theoretical literacy not only helps young cadres raise their theoretical level in writing materials but also enhances their ability to identify, view, analyze, and solve problems. For example, regarding a certain governance experience, young cadres with higher theoretical literacy can summarize and extract key points, producing materials that capture the essence and have visual impact, making them easier to promote.
Second, learning to improve professional skills. Grassroots young cadres urgently need to enhance their professional skills. As the level of professionalization in grassroots governance increases, the work in various lines becomes more specialized and specialized, posing significant challenges for non-professionals, especially in townships, who must undergo focused professional training, making professional learning outside of work increasingly important. For instance, before the 18th National Congress, when township discipline inspection work was not prioritized, the work they did mainly revolved around central tasks rather than discipline inspection tasks. After the 18th National Congress, with the emphasis on discipline inspection work at the township level, discipline inspection cadres must relearn legal knowledge across various fields, creating significant pressure to learn. Additionally, many townships implement rotation systems to train young middle-level cadres (leaders of various stations), requiring them to relearn professional knowledge each time they move to a new position, adding to their learning pressure.
Third, learning to improve comprehensive quality.
Grassroots young cadres need to enhance their comprehensive quality. Grassroots cadres, especially township cadres, are often versatile and need comprehensive knowledge and skills. When encountering related issues, they must possess relevant knowledge and the ability to solve related problems. Grassroots training for young cadres also adopts a multi-position training approach. Therefore, they need to acquire relevant knowledge while solving problems and also learn and store knowledge to address related issues.
For example, among grassroots young cadres, the directors of comprehensive offices in townships pay the most attention to public accounts, ranging from dozens to over a hundred, covering topics such as policies, laws, politics, economics, culture, governance, agriculture, and daily life. This is because comprehensive offices are coordinating departments that deal with various affairs in townships and rural areas, requiring their directors to master knowledge across various fields, which may also be applied when writing materials.
An office director mentioned that when township staff buy cars, they consult her about fuel consumption, so she must understand the fuel consumption of major vehicle models and follow relevant public accounts; if a young female cadre inquires about infant formula knowledge, she must pay attention to parenting-related public accounts.
How to stand out in the organization

The county discipline inspection commission mainly has two areas of work:#

One is handling cases, and the other is writing materials.
The work of writing materials is in the "Party Style Office," where the director assigns the chief to train in the Party Style Office.
The director of the Party Style Office is a veteran who speaks loudly to everyone. Generally, at the county level, it is difficult to be promoted even to the deputy section chief level.
When the director enters the Party Style Office, it coincides with the deputy director of the Party Style Office being promoted to director, with the director taking over as deputy director, thus becoming a formal section chief. The director does not interfere with the chief's work. This is beneficial for the director, as he can independently handle matters in the Party Style Office, directly liaising with the deputy secretary of the discipline inspection commission, quickly becoming familiar with basic work without needing to manage relationships with the director.
Ordinary civil servants can gain recognition and be reused by leaders by achieving the following six points:
First, they can endure hardship and do their jobs well;
Second, they do not complain about external circumstances, treating every job as an opportunity;
Third, they alleviate leaders' worries and difficulties, finding ways to complete tasks assigned by leaders without shirking responsibility;
Fourth, they innovate in their work, neither sticking to old rules nor being overly rigid;
Fifth, they are sincere, not engaging in opportunism at work, not flattering leaders, and not being duplicitous with colleagues;
Sixth, they maintain a positive attitude, pursuing progress without seeking promotion or wealth, and can handle setbacks in promotions with grace.
Grassroots political games manifest in the following two aspects:
First, the utilization of authoritative resources by line departments. The party committee and government possess authoritative resources; if line departments can gain the support of the party committee and government, they can better implement their policy tasks, including receiving more cooperation from other departments, and the grassroots levels will mobilize more resources for these policy tasks. Especially since county-level departments' policy tasks are implemented by townships, if they gain the attention of the township party secretary, their departmental affairs become priority work in the township, leading the township party secretary to focus on them and mobilize quality resources for completion. For county-level departments, the quality of policy task implementation is higher, saving human and material resources. To gain the attention of the township party secretary, they must first attract the attention of the county party committee and government, ideally making it a task for the county party committee and government.
County-level leaders focus on:
First, if a department's jurisdictional affairs encounter significant issues, even causing public opinion problems, the main leaders will inevitably intervene;
Second, department leaders lobby county-level leaders, first making the supervising leaders feel the importance, then having them persuade the county mayor and the county party secretary;
Third, creating highlight work for the department to attract the attention of county-level leaders;
Fourth, skirting the edges, attaching to other central tasks, such as embedding "private work" in documents or work committee files issued by the county party committee and government, thereby incorporating departmental affairs into the county's comprehensive assessment.
County-level leaders have their own will, judgment, and focus, and will not easily "bite" on proposals; their attention resources are not easily swayed.
Even when leaders show "attention," they will categorize their focus on departmental affairs: some are very important, some relatively important; some are emphasized for long periods, while others are only briefly; some will personally oversee and require responses, while others will delegate without further attention; some will hold on-site meetings, while others will convene joint meetings; some will issue documents, while others will only express verbally; some will attract the attention of main leaders, while others will be emphasized by supervising leaders.
If leaders exert equal effort on everything, they will exhaust themselves without necessarily achieving good results. Thus, department leaders understand that attracting leaders' attention to their affairs is not easy; to persuade leaders, they must present compelling reasons; otherwise, it would be a futile endeavor. Creating highlight work is not something that can be done casually. Therefore, department leaders will only approach leaders for genuinely important matters.
In the interaction and game between departments and line functions, only genuinely important or overarching departmental affairs will become political tasks for the county party committee and government, attracting the attention of county-level leaders.
Conversely, general departmental affairs are unlikely to receive significant attention from county-level leaders. This is the first equilibrium reached in the departmental game.
Second, the utilization of professional resources by line functions.
The party committee and government do not possess specific governance resources, especially professional resources beyond human and financial resources, including special funds, professionals, technical expertise, specialized equipment, and professional authority. These resources are held by government departments.
Professional resources are legally defined; using them requires legal qualifications and authority, following legal procedures, with many regulations that cannot be casually invoked.
Government departments use resources according to legal principles to implement professional affairs, undertaking the vast majority of county-level governance tasks. However, some affairs within the county are comprehensive and cannot be completed independently by a single department, requiring coordination of resources from multiple departments, including governance and policy topics initiated by county-level leaders to realize their political ambitions, commonly referred to as "leader-driven work," such as various movement-style governance initiatives, specifically small town construction, agricultural fund integration, sanitation actions, three reforms and one demolition, and comprehensive tourism.
To ensure that the work driven by county-level leaders is implemented, they must mobilize and integrate resources from relevant departments.
For leaders of relevant departments, on one hand, the tasks assigned by the county party committee and government are "social affairs" beyond their professional duties, which are additional tasks they do not wish to undertake.
Thus, when leaders first approach them, they instinctively seek various reasons to avoid the work, hoping that the leader-driven initiatives will "die in the womb."
On the other hand, leader-driven work often has tight deadlines, heavy tasks, and significant pressure, requiring changes in the channels, directions, and paths of resource flow among departments, which can create passive situations for departmental work.
Supporting the party committee and government’s work may require breaking rules; failing to support it may create a negative impression on leaders, and in severe cases, department leaders may be reassigned or not reused.
For example, a district mayor discovered that the use of agricultural funds in the district was scattered and chaotic, leading to inefficiency, and sought to reform and integrate these funds.
The mayor first investigated with the finance bureau, where a deputy director and a section chief opposed the mayor's proposal, arguing that the work was not compliant. The mayor became furious, and later, both were demoted to work in townships.
For leaders of government departments, they must "walk a tightrope" between not violating regulations and supporting the work of the party committee and government. They cannot completely disregard leader-driven work, nor can they blatantly violate regulations. They generally express support for the main leader's work but will also find many reasons to adjust the leader's thinking, ensuring they are not entirely led by the leader's ideas or carry out tasks strictly according to the leader's wishes. The main reason is related to relevant policies, laws, and regulations. When regulations are presented, leaders may suggest adjustments or flexibility, while departments may cite rigid regulations as a shield, claiming that adjustments are too troublesome and require provincial approval, which is time-consuming.
If leaders are to abandon their ideas entirely, they must provide sufficiently strong and legitimate reasons to dissuade them. Such situations are generally rare.
For leaders, to push their ideas into county-level work, they must first ensure that the leaders of relevant departments understand their ideas and intentions, transforming their ideas into those of the department leaders, thereby gaining support for the work and jointly formulating and implementing policies.
This requires leaders to frequently participate in various research meetings, discussion meetings, negotiation meetings, mobilization meetings, etc., with their main attention focused here.
County-level leaders, in communicating and negotiating with departments, must propose counter-strategies based on the actual situation of the departments and timely adjust their own ideas. Leaders must maintain their views while also providing suitable reasons to persuade department leaders, avoiding issuing commands exclusively.

The back-and-forth game involves debates, compromises, struggles, and conflicts, consuming a significant amount of time and energy from leaders.

Since government departments are not entirely "obedient" nor completely disruptive, they will exert a "constraint" and "supervision" effect on the work leaders wish to promote. Leaders' attention is a scarce resource, and "leaders stepping in" is the most scarce resource:

Only genuinely important matters will prompt leaders to step in and be physically present. To promote work, leaders must engage in face-to-face communication, coordination, and games with departments, consuming the most scarce resources.
Due to the constraints posed by government departments, leaders cannot easily accomplish "promoting work," meaning that the work leaders wish to promote must be genuinely important and recognized by departments, rather than trivial matters being pushed to the forefront.
In other words, under the departmental relationship system, it is not easy for county-level leaders to accomplish tasks, so they must focus on important matters.
In this system, doing good work is not easy, and doing bad work is also relatively difficult. Because of departmental constraints, the probability of doing bad work is lower, while there may be more acceptance of good work. This is the apparent logic. This is the second equilibrium reached in the departmental game.
Combining these two equilibria, the transformation of departmental business into political tasks for the party committee and government involves important business, while the work of the party committee and government to integrate departmental resources is also significant. Only important matters can be transformed into political tasks, and only important matters can justify the integration of departmental resources.
In the implementation of work, the relationship between departments and townships
With increasing emphasis on work implementation, county-level departments must strengthen their efforts.
Departments can take two measures:
First, strengthen the "legs" of departments established in townships and villages by improving the organizational system of departments to enhance work implementation. In Beijing's Pinggu District, each department not only has its own station in townships but also employs full-time staff at the village level, such as judicial officers from the judicial office, civil affairs staff from the civil affairs office, disability assistance staff from the disabled persons' federation, and land assistants from the land office. The more complete the organizational system of a department, the stronger its capacity, leading to better implementation of work tasks. Each department hopes to have "long legs," continuously appealing to the personnel office for more positions.
Second, strengthen the motivation for townships through the emphasis placed by township party committees and governments to promote departmental work implementation. This involves the relationship between departments and townships within the hierarchical system. Departments are the units responsible for business work, and business work needs to be implemented in townships; the implementation of departmental work is related to the level of attention from townships.
As a level of party committee and government, townships have their own priorities and judgments and will not exert equal effort on all departmental affairs. Consequently, for departments to implement their work effectively, they must compete for the attention of township leaders, fully mobilizing their enthusiasm. Although departments represent the county party committee and government, townships cannot shirk their responsibilities regarding departmental work, but in terms of hierarchy, townships and departments are at the same level, with no subordinate relationship, meaning departments cannot force townships to prioritize their work.
In most regions, the organizational system of departments has not yet penetrated to the village level, and in townships, they primarily rely on their own relevant forces. Therefore, departmental work implementation mainly relies on mobilizing township resources. Departments can mobilize townships through personal relationships, for example, if a bureau chief has a good personal relationship with a township party secretary, they may call to request the secretary's attention to their work. However, personal relationships are incidental, and departments need to mobilize townships through institutional norms, which involves issues of hierarchical relationships.

The mobilization of townships by departments mainly occurs in two ways:#

One is resource mobilization, and the other is assessment mobilization,
forming a relationship of resource allocation and assessment distribution between departments and townships. The relationship evolves into one between county-level departments and townships. Departments need to allocate resources to townships, while townships need autonomy; township cadres must "save themselves," leading to various countermeasures such as evading responsibility and formalism.
Within the unit, the personnel authority of the main leader includes two aspects:
First, decision-making authority, which pertains to the authority to make decisions regarding middle-level and lower-level cadres within the unit.
This is the primary power of the unit's main leader, who uses personnel decision-making authority to motivate ordinary and middle-level cadres.
Second, recommendation authority, which is the power to recommend middle-level leaders or team members from the unit to higher-level organizational departments. For individuals within the unit to gain recognition from the organizational department, the recommendations and opinions of the unit's main leader are crucial.
The more cadres from the unit that the main leader recommends to the organizational department and who are subsequently promoted and reused, the faster the internal leadership flow within the unit, and the greater the motivation for internal leadership cadres.

The personnel recommendation authority of the unit's main leader depends on their political status and future prospects within the jurisdiction. If the main leader has a high political status in the jurisdiction, such as having served as party secretary in multiple townships and as head of various departments, they will be recognized highly in county politics in terms of both qualifications and work ability, giving them a voice in county politics and face in front of county leaders, making it easier for their recommended cadres to gain approval. For instance, if a party secretary transforms an economically backward and politically unstable township into a model township for the entire county, gaining recognition from county leaders and all county cadres, that party secretary will hold a high position in county politics, and the organizational department and county leaders will provide more support to them. If the county does not support these politically prominent unit leaders or does not consider their recommendations more, how can they motivate these individuals?
Working under leaders with political prospects and future potential provides subordinates with better opportunities for advancement, increasing the likelihood of upward mobility, and enhancing their political status in the locality. Consequently, they are more politically motivated to work hard, which in turn enhances the organizational mobilization power of leaders over the unit.
When a unit is mobilized by the organization, more people work hard, and more people are dedicated, making it easier for leaders' intentions to be implemented, leading to better performance from the unit. The leaders will perform better in the political competition, gaining more political status and future prospects, thus having more voice in the political life of the jurisdiction, creating positive feedback.
Conversely, if the main leader of a unit has no status in the political life of the jurisdiction and is perceived as lacking political prospects, their personnel recommendation authority in the higher-level organizational department or among leaders will be weak, leading to fewer cadres from the unit being recommended upward, resulting in less personnel movement within the unit, with many cadres remaining stagnant for years, leading to low work enthusiasm among cadres. At the same time, if the main leader of the unit has no political status or future, it will also affect the status of the unit and its staff in the political life of the jurisdiction, making them feel constrained in comparisons or evaluations against other units and their staff.

For example, in annual evaluations, weaker units have fewer slots and are looked down upon by other units and their staff. Consequently, fewer people follow such unit leaders, and their words and directives are not heeded, leading to a lack of proactive support for them.
Thus, the mobilization power of unit leaders over their staff weakens, making it difficult to promote many tasks within the unit, resulting in the unit lagging in the competition, and the leader's status in the political life of the jurisdiction declining further, leading to even less personnel movement within the unit, creating negative feedback.
Leaders without political prospects (status) lead to a lack of motivation among subordinates; leaders with greater political prospects (status) inspire subordinates to work harder.
This is the basic principle of "unit politics." As Professor Fang Ning said, the official title is the "master switch" for cadres; using official titles to motivate officials returns to the fundamental laws of political recruitment.
Leaders with political status and prospects imply that subordinates may gain greater official titles, which can motivate and mobilize subordinates.
Third, there are differences in the sources of authority.
At the frontline, leadership authority comes from the power conferred by positions; the more important the position, the greater the power, and the more authority one has in front of subordinates. For example, the township party secretary, as the top leader of the township, holds more power than the township head and other team members, giving them greater authority in front of subordinates.
Additionally, leadership authority also stems from personal ability and charisma.
The personal abilities of frontline leaders include mobilizing resources, coordinating relationships, solving problems, and responding to crises. The stronger their abilities, the more charismatic they are as leaders, leading subordinates to respect them and willingly follow their directives.
Conversely, if a leader is incompetent and cannot solve problems, or if they are "an outsider leading insiders," they will not establish credibility in front of subordinates, who will not be loyal to the leader or work hard for them. For frontline leaders, power and ability complement each other; both are indispensable.
At non-frontline levels, the abilities and personal charisma of leaders are less important; as long as they occupy a position of power, their commands and directives will be conveyed, arranged, and executed by subordinates.
The so-called "power operation" is essentially the transmission of political will between leaders and subordinates, and the smoothness of this transmission relates to the state of the relationship between "leaders and subordinates."
"Unit politics" discusses the importance of leaders having political status and prospects for gaining loyalty from subordinates and organizing them effectively. Subordinates tie their political futures to their leaders, as loyalty is not driven by fear of the leader's power but rather by a commitment to the leader.
The basic principle of "frontline politics" is that, due to the need to solve specific problems directly, frontline leaders must possess the ability to address those specific issues. This is both a requirement from the frontline for leaders and an expectation from subordinates. If leaders can meet these requirements and expectations, they can establish an "authority-loyalty" relationship with subordinates, facilitating the organization and mobilization of subordinates.
Grassroots areas do not lack personnel; they lack resources such as finances, power, and policies.
To perform well, it is necessary to mobilize staff to the greatest extent possible. The "segment-line combination" system divides township work into hierarchical work, grassroots work, and key work, and through a "two-way selection" approach, different individuals are assigned to different positions, achieving an optimal combination of people and tasks, and unifying work with training and motivation, thereby fully mobilizing the enthusiasm of township cadres.
The river chief system operates within the party and government framework, with its authority stemming from the party committee's power, also belonging to the pressure-type system.
The party committee only assigns responsibilities without corresponding funding or institutional support.
The responsibility system requires a supervision system to be implemented, which includes three aspects of grassroots supervision: inspection, patrol, and oversight.
Inspection corresponds to the responsibility for completing tasks, oversight corresponds to the responsibility for fulfilling duties, and patrol corresponds to the responsibility for making statements. Thus, while inspection, patrol, and oversight all imply supervision and checking, the content they supervise differs: inspection focuses on "tasks," oversight focuses on "duties," and patrol focuses on "responsibilities." Each has its own division of labor while being interconnected.
Inspection focuses on tasks.
The so-called "task inspection" involves urging responsible individuals to complete tasks according to the nature of the affairs. Inspections are the supervisory checks conducted by the party committee and government or line departments on the completion status of assigned work, belonging to business inspections.
Inspection tasks can be divided into two types:
First, prescribed inspections, where the inspection office conducts inspections based on key task arrangements;
Second, inspections based on reports from responsible departments or third parties regarding problematic tasks.
Specific inspection methods include research and dark visits, understanding the situation, writing reports, providing feedback to responsible parties, and requiring corrective opinions within a specified timeframe. After feedback on corrections, the inspection office may also conduct follow-up visits to check the implementation of corrections and report the situation to the county committee or county government. If the responsible unit fails to rectify adequately, the reasons must be identified. If it is an objective reason, the objective problem continues to be addressed; if it is a subjective issue, such as an attitude problem or a violation of discipline, the problem clues will be handed over. Inspections achieve a closed loop.
Under the supervision and accountability system, the relationship between county and township governments has been reshaped; the relationship between upper and lower-level governments is no longer one of mutual "collusion" for interests but rather one of mutual responsibility evasion. To enforce accountability at lower levels, higher-ups must increase the intensity of accountability; once problems arise, they first pursue accountability at lower levels, and the greater the pursuit, the more responsibility they can shift away from themselves. Lower levels may respond to pressure from above by leaving traces rather than substantively addressing work.